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The proposition that the news media increasingly report about the ‘process’ of politics over 
the ‘issues’ has gathered general acceptance amongst the political class and academic 
observers. Thomas Patterson documented ‘a quiet revolution’ in American political 
journalism in the past 40 years, whereby there was a fundamental shift from issue-based 
stories to process-based ones.1 Frank Esser et al. outline three stages of this development, 
which have also been witnessed in other Western democracies such as the UK.2 In the period 
of issue orientation that prevailed until the early 1970s, the news was primarily concerned 
with the key issues each candidate/ party stood for and what their victory would mean for the 
average voter. Since then, in the strategic stage, focus shifted towards how parties/ candidates 
ran their campaign and how this might affect their electoral prospects. Since the early 1990s, 
political journalism has added a meta level to their coverage, where they examine how 
politicians and their handlers are utilising the media for their own ends, as well as reflect on 
the media’s own involvement in the political process.  
For the past four UK general elections, the Electoral Commission has commissioned 
a comprehensive content analysis of election news coverage where the main themes of news 
are classified, with process news being one such theme. These studies define process news as: 
‘campaigning strategies, opinion polls/ horse race news, passing references to the chosen 
daily topic agendas of political parties, political tensions and infighting within parties, party 
spin/ PR/ news management, and other themes’.3 Most observers of campaign news and its 
critiques will be familiar with these terms, though various other concepts are included in this 
definition. For example, process news captures the tendency for the news media to focus on 
political strategy and its emphasis on winning and losing, campaign tactics and personal 
battles in the political arena.4 Process news also encapsulates aspects of metacoverage, where 
journalists turn the spotlight inward and report on themselves, and the communication–related 
publicity efforts aimed at them, as integral parts of their stories.5 Whilst its roots lie in 
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analyses of election news, elements of process news also apply to everyday politics outside of 
election periods.6  
Evidence from the Electoral Commission studies shows how the amount of process 
news during UK elections now regularly accounts for around half of overall coverage,7 with a 
peak of 70 percent recorded at the 2010 election leading Ivor Gaber to describe it as a ‘policy-
free environment’.8 Longitudinal studies from UK elections are scarce, but content analyses 
of general elections dating back to the early 1970s suggest that process news was far less 
prominent, typically accounting for around 20-30 percent of election campaign news.9  
The rise of process news therefore represents one of the most profound shifts in 
journalistic style in recent decades. With the intense scrutiny supplied by the concerns over 
political engagement in recent years, many have offered these changes in journalistic style as 
a causal explanation. In this chapter I will take up some of these normative questions. I will 
firstly document the driving forces behind process news, and then examine the democratic 
implications of its rise. Whilst there is no shortage of debate on aspects of process news, it is 
often polarised and not evidence based. I argue that there are many dimensions to debates on 
process news: whilst many critiques of process news underestimate its value in demystifying 
aspects of political reality that were once invisible, we should be concerned about the amount 
of process news and the tendency for it to be framed cynically. In the final section I explore 
what practical steps could be made to rectify some of the problems associated with process 
news, in order to create an environment in which citizenship might thrive.  
 
The changing environment of political newsmaking and its consequences 
 
There are many reasons for the striking rise in process news. Firstly, there are a number of 
well-documented cultural developments that have impacted on political journalism in 
particular.10 In the United States, some scholars have identified the fall-out of Vietnam and 
Watergate as important milestones in the transformation of the culture of political 
journalism.11 In Britain, even without the seismic moment of Watergate, the same changes in 
the ‘media-politics nexus’ took place.12 These events had the effect of redefining deference 
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that journalists had towards politicians, as they came to realise that they had for too long been 
complicit in the government information agenda. Whilst the daily news agenda remained 
largely determined by the actions of politicians, the congeniality and fraternity between 
journalists and politicians was supplemented by greater hostility and distrust. Journalists felt 
emboldened to draw attention to the rivalries and backstage elements of politics, often with a 
cynical slant. In fact, Patterson believes that for many reporters, conflict and controversy are 
now actually seen as the real issues of politics, and so this explains their obsession with it: 
 
The press deals with charge and countercharge, rarely digging into the details of 
political positions or social conditions underlying policy problems. It is not simply 
that the press neglects issues in favor of the strategic game: issues, even when 
covered, are subordinated to the drama of conflict generated by the opposing sides.13 
 
In the past 30 years we have witnessed the ongoing ‘mediatization’ of politics, whereby 
politics is increasingly carried out through the media, as that is where it is ‘located’.14 For 
politicians, mediatization is a thorny matter, as it gives them the opportunities to 
communicate with voters, but not always on their own terms, creating a tension with their 
own ‘political logic’.15 As a large body of literature has documented, party communications 
across the world have undergone a process of professionalization in order to control or at least 
manage the demands of the media.16 This in turn has had major implications for the 
relationship between politicians and journalists. The relentless and at times aggressive 
promotion of political messages by party and government spin doctors places great strains on 
the autonomy of journalists.17 Process news is one of the strategies they have developed to 
counter this, as it draws specific attention to attempts to influence the presentation of politics 
through news management. John Zaller draws upon the concept of professionalism to explain 
this process. He concludes that journalists would cease to be professionals if they were forced 
into the role of newsreaders or mere conduits for politicians.18 So whilst politicians are still 
very successful at setting the news agenda, in order to retain a sense of professional self-
esteem, reporters therefore want to add something to the news – to be a professional that not 
only reports but also selects, frames, comments upon, investigates, interprets and regulates the 
flow of political communication. In their view, ‘what journalists add should be, in their ideal, 
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as arresting and manifestly important as possible - if possible, the most important aspect of 
each news report, so as to call attention to journalists and the importance of their work’.19  
Mediatization also – quite legitimately – gives the news media licence to report on 
itself, as it no longer solely looks upon politics from the outside, but is a political institution 
of considerable power.20 Process news, or more specifically metacoverage, is a logical 
outgrowth of this, and describes the inclination of reporters to turn the spotlight inward and 
treat themselves as actors, even autonomous sources, in their own stories. Other times it might 
include ‘self reverential’ discussions of the media’s own impact on an election campaign, or a 
politician’s appearance on one medium (e.g. television) being the subject of a story on 
another (e.g. press).21 Such reporting has been facilitated by the growth of specialist media 
pages in the press, themselves a reflection of the media’s central role in contemporary culture 
and politics. Similarly, the Internet has facilitated metacoverage, as the mainstream news 
media pick up on trending topics on Twitter for example, or commission navel-gazing 
features on the impact of new media on politics. 
 
Structural changes 
 
In the last 20-30 years, the news media environment has changed dramatically. This has been 
driven by technological developments: satellite, cable and latterly digital signals have opened 
the door for new television channels to be launched without great costs, including 24 hour 
news channels; likewise in the newspaper sector, falling printing costs have been one reason 
for greater pagination and the launch of freesheets; technology also provided an entirely new 
platform for media expansion: the internet. Alongside technology, governments have allowed 
a liberalisation of media markets, thus ending the days of spectrum scarcity and enabling a 
more commercially-based media system. These developments transformed the information 
environment, seeing an explosion in the number of news outlets, and subsequent 
fragmentation of news audiences.22 
The dramatic changes in the media environment have been mirrored by important 
cultural changes in their audience. In particular, the rise of a consumer culture which is based 
around consumption and individuality.23 News media audiences are thus increasingly 
behaving like consumers in the media market, so given greater choice, they have responded 
by relinquishing their former loyalties, and increasingly obtaining their news from a wider 
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variety of sources.24 Traditional news outlets such as evening television news broadcasts and 
newspapers have seen a decline in their audience figures, as more people migrate to 
alternative news sources offered by new media technologies. 
One of the most important consequences of these forces has been the intensification 
of competition for audiences among news organisations. Journalism has traditionally been a 
competitive industry, typified by the kudos bequeathed to those who break an ‘exclusive’ 
story ahead of their rivals. What has accelerated in the last 20-30 years is the greater exposure 
of news organisations to commercial pressures. As news media output burgeons, so the finite 
advertising spend is spread more thinly, thus impacting upon overall profitability and as a 
consequence the budgets that can be allocated to newsgathering.25 Within the newsroom, a 
major study by Justin Lewis et al. revealed a number of significant patterns underpinned by 
the political economy of contemporary news.26 Firstly, as news organisations diversify into 
multimedia operations more news space is required to fill, but on the whole more journalists 
are not being hired to fill it. Instead, staff journalists are asked to be more productive, with 
their sample of journalists producing an average of 4.5 stories per day27, and more than two-
thirds of those surveyed (30 out of 42) believing that journalists were filing more stories each 
shift than they were a decade ago.  
These pressures place even greater emphasis on news values, and hence for owners 
and editors concerned with the bottom-line, process news is cheap, quick, and in their view 
attracts larger audiences than news focused on the substance of policies and politics. For time-
pressed journalists, it is easier to put a new twist on the day’s news by focusing on the game 
of politics than by researching issues of policy.28 Process news fits many news values that are 
important to the selection and presentation of the news, such as ‘human interest’, ‘conflict’ 
and ‘controversy’.29 It is also perpetually new: there will always be another twist, manoeuvre, 
or stumble in the game of politics.30  
Timothy Cook has argued that many ‘daily news stories are episodes of larger 
continuing sagas … Simply put, for news to be produced routinely, journalists must be able to 
visualize events as part of a larger, broader storyline and must move the plot along from one 
episode to the next’.31 These sagas are often said to have a certain ‘phase structure’32, and so 
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the newsworthiness of events is determined by whether or not they move the saga to the ‘next’ 
step.33 When it comes to elections, reporters often treat them as if they fit into a ‘master 
narrative’, whereby the election day is the finishing line, and everything that happens during 
an election campaign is significant only for its relevance towards a candidate’s or party’s 
chances of crossing that line.34 Process news provides the perfect framework for journalists to 
interpret the election ‘master narrative’ of the ‘race’ for the line whereas policy coverage fits 
much less comfortably. The same can be said of non-election periods.35 UN resolution votes, 
public inquiries, or even the saga of the splits in the UK coalition government all share a 
‘phase structure’, whereby journalists can relate the day’s news to its likely implications for 
the ongoing saga through process news.36 
 
The ‘problem’ of process news 
 
This takes us to some of the democratic implications of process news. The list of charges held 
up against process news (including its close relatives, self-coverage, metacoverage and 
strategic frames) is serious. Firstly, there is a complaint that process news is largely trivial, 
and its replacement of substantial and weighty news has stifled learning about political issues, 
and the ability of audiences to engage with political life is compromised. For Bennett the 
result of a media concerned with the spectacle of news is that it can disconnect its audience 
from the power to participate actively in political life.37 They are ‘passive receivers, no longer 
active participants, in the dialogue of democracy’ and the ability to understand policy issues, 
generate opinions, and hold politicians to account is thus lost.38 
This can then result in or aggravate a second problem: disenchantment and cynicism 
towards the political process. Many aspects of what constitutes process news are ‘inherently 
cynical’ according to Kerbel, Apee and Ross: politics is presented as a game played by 
ruthless, Machiavellian, power-hungry politicians.39 As Fallows explains: ‘By choosing to 
present public life as a contest between scheming political leaders, all of whom the public 
should view with suspicion, the mass media helps bring about that very result’.40 
Such a sweeping critique is tempting to subscribe to, and regularly is by both media 
critics and politicians keen to move focus towards ‘real issues’. But it is underpinned by a 
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number of assumptions, some of which are sustainable and others that are flawed. These will 
be explored in the following section.   
 
It is becoming harder to sustain the normative distinction between ‘issues’ and ‘process’.  
 
Dichotomies can be appealing and convenient, but sometimes mask a more complex truth. 
Whilst the rise in process news is quite clear and unambiguous, its status as a ‘non-issue’ is 
less so. Firstly, the UK represents a postmodern political culture where the distinction 
between ‘political’ and entertainment is increasingly blurred.41 The private lives of politicians, 
their personality traits, looks, dress sense, personal rivalries and presentational performance 
have all become more important in our increasingly emotionalised public sphere.42 In the 
context of the 2010 UK General election, Ipsos Mori found that voters ranked the image of 
the leaders as important as the policies in deciding how to vote.43 This was the first time 
leaders were ranked as high as policies since they first asked this question in 1987. Of course, 
this cultural shift towards image and personality may be partly a result of media coverage, but 
it would seem unfair to dismiss all process news as trivial in this context. 
Secondly, the extensive use of sophisticated communications methods by 
governments and political parties is an issue of democratic concern, and so worthy of 
reportage. Ten years ago, a UK government special advisor’s internal announcement that 9/11 
was ‘a good day to bury bad news’ seemed to encapsulate a government obsessed by ‘spin’, 
and accompanied a wider critique of a ‘symbolic state’ in which the perception of policy 
delivery was more important than actual delivery.44 The subsequent ‘demystification’ of spin 
offered by journalists was both a rational response to a changing environment, and the raising 
of an issue of public interest which represents a progressive evolution in our political culture 
towards one of greater transparency and scrutiny.45 Whilst coverage of news management and 
political PR is process news, it is not necessarily a ‘non-issue’.  
 
Who says you cannot learn from process news? 
 
Alternative forms of journalism such as blogs, breakfast news, panel and debate shows, and 
even satirical news shows such as The Daily Show or 10 O’clock Live are gaining increasing 
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acceptance as a legitimate part of the informational diet of citizens.46 Whilst process news 
does not represent an alternative form of journalism, it can give citizens a more rounded 
picture of political reality than information on policies alone. McNair cautiously welcomes 
process news as ‘the emergence of a demystificatory, potentially empowering commentary on 
the nature of the political process; an ongoing deconstruction of the relationship between 
journalism and the powerful which adds to, rather than detracts from, the stock of useful 
information available to the average citizen’.47 Of course, this rests on the assumption that a) 
citizens are likely to be able to easily access coverage of policies as well as process and b) 
most process news is presented in an empowering way. These two issues will be taken up 
later.  
 
The problematic role of politicians in process news 
 
As mentioned earlier, as both campaigning and governing have become increasingly media-
centred48, so politicians must accommodate the ‘media logic’ and standards of 
newsworthiness,49 which privilege the visual;50 dramatic, conflict or scandal based;51 human 
interest; and episodic (as opposed to thematic).52 Thus whilst politicians may complain of the 
media obsession with process over issues (for e.g. see Tony Blair’s final speech as Prime 
Minister, 2007), they have often been complicit in its rise to prominence. However, it is 
interesting to note that academic studies of process news invariably take a media-centric 
perspective, thus placing the blame for its deleterious consequences on the news media. There 
are serious limitations to this.  
Conflict – including attack and counter attack – is a deeply embedded part of the 
UK’s political culture and is theatrically performed weekly during Prime Minister’s Questions. 
Politicians regularly accuse each other of spin and deception; and will emphasise the divisions 
in their opponents’ ranks for their own political gain. The ‘soap opera’ of Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown’s relationship during the last Labour government was an obsession of the 
media, but news was littered with quotes from opposition politicians who were keen to stoke 
the fire of a story that undermined their rivals.53 Similarly, the news media are often 
castigated for employing the language of the ‘horse race’, war and games in their election 
                                                            
46 See Atton and Hamilton, Alternative Journalism; Jones, Entertaining Politics; Peters, ‘Emotion 
Aside or Emotional Side?’ 
47 McNair 2000, Journalism and Democracy, pp. 171-172. 
48 Esser and Spanier, ‘News Management as News’ 
49 Stromback, ‘Four Phases of Mediatization’. 
50 Bucy and Grabe, ‘Taking Television Seriously’. 
51 de Vreese, Framing Europe; Sabato, Feeding Frenzy; Stromback and Kaid, The Handbook of 
Election News Coverage around the World. 
52 Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues 
53 Jackson, ‘Strategic News Frames and Public Policy Debates’. 
coverage54 but this is also the language that politicians use to both internal and external 
audiences. For example, in his ‘State of the race – memo 4’ to Labour party members during 
the 2010 General Election, Peter Mandelson said:  
  
We are the underdogs in this fight – always have been. 
But, with as much as a third of the electorate still undecided, this election remains 
wide open. The polls are so volatile because people remain in a state of genuine flux. 
So it is time to up the tempo and fight every inch of the way.55 
 
Studies that have examined the agendas of political parties in elections reveal a sharp rise in 
the focus on political process. For the 1983 election, Semetko et al. found that parties placed a 
great deal of emphasis on ‘substantive issues’ (measured through press releases), with a 
minimum of 60 percent and a maximum of 80 percent of their press releases primarily 
focused on policies.56 In 1997, an analysis of party PEBs and press releases found this figure 
to be 75 percent.57 By 2005, Gaber reported that in their press releases the parties had made 
election strategy and tactics their single biggest issue, with Labour and the Conservatives 
devoting around 47 percent of their announcements to either attacking their opponents, or 
urging voters to get out and vote or not vote for their opponents, a trend that accelerated in the 
2010 election.58 By feeding the media stories of conflict, splits and spin, politicians can be 
seen as active agents in the rise of process news.  
 
The ‘negative’ effects of process news can be questioned 
 
Part of the critique of process news is rooted in the media malaise thesis that places the media 
at the centre of the process of voter disengagement and cynicism. This is hotly disputed in the 
political communication literature. Often based on large-scale survey evidence, a major 
finding of the ‘media mobilisation’ literature is the more a citizen consumes news media, the 
more likely they are to be politically knowledgeable and engaged, which in turn motivates 
them to seek out more political information, akin to a ‘virtuous circle’.59 Critics of process 
news would not dispute this, but instead contend that it still does not discount the possibility 
of a ‘spiral of cynicism’ for those who consume the least news, or certain types of news. 
Indeed, Norris’ own data showed that those who consumed the least news on the European 
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elections were less likely to believe they could trust Brussels bureaucrats and MEPs, and this 
pattern was likely to be self reinforcing – so people who know least about the EU and have 
minimal trust, will probably pay little attention to news about EU, on rational grounds.60 The 
virtuous circle and spiral of cynicism theories are therefor arguably more compatible than 
many would believe. For those who are interested in politics, there is a mutually reinforcing 
cycle of news consumption and political engagement. But this can work the opposite way for 
the disengaged: because they lack interest and feel detached from politics, they are less likely 
to consume political news, which again reinforces their detachment from politics. 
The spiral of cynicism thesis posits that strategically framed news (emphasising the 
tactics employed by politicians in pursuing policy/ electoral goals, as well as their 
performance, styles of campaigning, and personal battles in the political arena) can activate 
cynicism towards the politicians involved, as well as the wider political process.61 Meanwhile, 
issue-based news has been found to potentially reverse the spiral of cynicism for young 
voters.62  Empirical support for the thesis has been found in a number of contexts, though 
levels of political engagement and sophistication have been often been found to moderate the 
effects of such frames.63 When metacoverage (news about the press’ own role in political 
affairs, and attempts by politicians to gain publicity) is framed strategically, similar results 
have been found.64 The effects of this news should be cause for concern, but whilst the link 
between strategic frames and voter cynicism is well established, the relationship between 
cynicism and political engagement is less so, meaning it is possible that under some 
circumstances, voters can be both ‘cynical and engaged’.65 Nevertheless, it would be 
misguided to dismiss the concerns raised by the effects of strategically framed process news 
given the balance of evidence garnered to date.  
 
Perhaps citizens prefer process news to policy 
 
It might be fair to assume that because strategically framed process news activates cynicism 
in some individuals, they will be less favourable to this type of news presentation. This is 
based on Cappella and Jamieson’s evidence that the spiral of cynicism can spread from 
cynicism about those politicians portrayed as Machiavellian in news reports, to cynicism 
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towards the media as the messenger.66 On the other hand, process news is partly a result of 
market pressures, which demand that news be presented in a format that has significant 
entertainment and interest value, even at the expense of civic or educational value.67 The 
assumption here being that the uncertainty and suspense associated with the depiction of 
politicians as strategic players, plus the focus on personality-related stories, are more likely to 
catch and hold the audience’s attention than more substantive aspects of the election or issue.  
It seems previous research has provided evidence for both propositions. In the USA, 
public opinion surveys have shown that citizens are not happy about campaign formats that 
inject cynical views of the political process.68 Calls for more ‘substantive’ reporting of 
politics by Patterson and Franklin contain the implicit assumption that the public would be 
happier if campaigns provided more and ‘better’ information (with a greater commitment to 
explaining issues as opposed to dramatising them).69 This view was challenged by Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, who found that while citizens indeed dislike campaigns, they do not 
necessarily desire more deliberation around the issues.70 Instead, they want simple cues so 
they can size up candidates with minimal effort. If anything, election coverage should 
therefore be less demanding (i.e. substantive and issue-focused). Lipsitz et al. place 
themselves somewhere in between the ‘deliberative’ and ‘undemanding’ perspectives. They 
found attitudes to campaigns vary considerably based on various attitudinal and demographic 
factors. Most importantly, politically involved citizens desire more ‘substantive’ campaigns, 
whereas the less involved are more open to process news. 71 
As with the US studies, most evidence of audience evaluations of the news in the UK 
is based on a campaign context. Recent election opinion surveys asking the public to rate the 
media’s performance have found them to be generally happy with the amount of news, but 
more critical of its content. In 2001 and 2005 for example, the majority thought coverage 
should be less leader focussed and more policy and local candidate focused.72 Other evidence 
suggests that a substantial part of the population feel short of information during elections73, 
though it does not explicitly say this is a result of a media focus on process over issues. 
Qualitative reports about young people and politics offer some more useful evidence towards 
this debate. White et al. for example, found them to view media coverage of politics as too 
often framed around party squabbles in Parliament, which reinforced their view of it as 
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‘boring’.74 The young also appear to have picked up on media cynicism. Their message to the 
media was ‘Make politics interesting and exciting for us – relate it to our lives but don’t 
trivialise it with stories about politicians’ private lives or political in-fighting – we’re not 
interested’.75 The handful of studies that have examined audience evaluations of strategically 
framed process news versus issue-based news have found (perhaps unsurprisingly) that 
citizens have both a greater sense of learning from issue-based news, as well as placing a 
higher value on its informational content.76  
Despite some of the contradictions, all of this research supports the idea of an 
electorate who are critical of the media’s current coverage of political affairs. This is set 
against a backdrop of declining levels of trust in news organisations, particularly 
newspapers.77 Importantly, what the evidence does tell us is that we should challenge part of 
the logic behind why process news is so commonly used in everyday political journalism: the 
belief that it holds more news value and therefore appeals to audiences. Whilst there is 
unquestionably some audience demand for process news, including ‘political junkies’ (like 
your author) who want to know about both the substance of political issues and the ‘politics’ 
of them, the evidence does not support a demand for the amount of process news that we 
regularly see in UK news, especially in recent elections.  
 
Coming to terms with process news 
 
Whilst defending the importance of process news in a diet of news consumption, alongside its 
empowering and demystifying potential; and recognising the active role politicians play in the 
cycle of political gossip, speculation and tactical manoeuvrings; there are two main conditions 
this defence rests upon. The first is the balance of issue-based versus process news that the 
average citizen is likely to encounter. The second condition is the framing of process news in 
cynical or edifying terms. There is reason for concern about both of these. 
 
It is the sheer amount of process news 
 
Zaller rightly argues that many media critics expect an unrealistic standard of journalism, and 
questions whether most citizens would be willing or capable enough to fully process what he 
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calls the ‘full news standard’.78 But whilst accepting the case for ‘multidimensional public 
spheres’ to suit the needs of different sections of the public,79 the weight of evidence from 
existing content analyses suggests that most citizens are likely to find it increasingly hard to 
learn about policy issues. During elections, when the focus on process news intensifies, 
typically between 50-80 percent of stories focus primarily on political process.80Whilst there 
are not the same number of campaign set-piece events or opinion polls to write about in-
between elections – and therefore less process news – it is clear that it penetrates into the 
governing process as well.  
But beyond the sheer amount of process news lie deeper concerns for the average 
citizen. In the context of EU news, Jackson found that process news is disproportionately 
prominent a) in the news media that is consumed by the most people: namely TV news and 
tabloid newspapers, and b) at the top of the news agenda, so that readers/ viewers would 
normally have to get beyond the main news stories before encountering issue-based news.81 
Studies have also found how the ebb and flow of news during non-election policy debates 
privileges process news over policy issues at key times. In the context of various debates in 
the US and UK, when the policy decision was being discussed and decided both behind 
closed doors and in the public sphere, the news more commonly offered strategic angles. 
Once the decision had been announced, the news placed greater emphasis on the policy 
issues.82 It is arguably very reasonable for journalists to focus more on the political game 
when policy is being debated, and that when decided, attention might then turn to its 
implementation and possible consequences for ordinary citizens. But this phase structure can 
crowd-out or delay substantive coverage of those issues. For citizens, it means that at 
precisely the time when public opinion is most likely to be formulated, mobilised, and 
listened to by politicians, they are given news that encourages them to think about political 
strategies, party prospects and media management (often framed with a cynical slant); rather 
than empowering them to be part of the policy debate by explaining what impact the policy 
may have on their own life.  
So whilst process news can give citizens a more rounded picture of political reality, 
there is evidence that it has cut so deeply into issue-based coverage that many citizens are 
unlikely to receive a sufficient basis for making informed choices of their own.  
 
The question of cynicism  
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 Process news is not inherently cynical, and its focus on political motivations, political PR and 
presentation can be presented in an educational or empowering way. However, too often it is 
depicted in adversarial and cynical terms. Studies examining metacoverage (during elections) 
have found that such stories were mainly narrated with (cynical) strategy frames rather than 
(edifying) accountability frames.83 Esser et al. highlight the term ‘spin doctor’ as an example 
of this.84 Journalists could not serve their public task without the information provided by PR 
officials, and as long as this information is presented in a reliable and ethical way then there is 
nothing inherently undemocratic about the PR function itself. But many news outlets use the 
term ‘spin doctor’ to indiscriminately demonise any kind of professional PR. 
 
The journalistic use of the term spin doctor occurs in a one-sided and problematic 
sense whenever it serves to discredit the legitimate interest of politicians, parties, and 
governments in asserting themselves against the autonomous and powerful journalism 
that pursues an agenda of its own and whose mechanisms and motives are not always 
exclusively oriented toward the public welfare (Esser et al., 2001, pp39-40). 
 
Findings from content analyses to date have therefore found that rather than presenting 
process news in a way that could empower ‘a political public sphere in crisis’, more often 
than not it takes the form of an adversarial battleground that does more to encourage public 
cynicism and distrust.  
 
Retelling journalism. Retelling politics 
 
In this chapter I have documented the rise of process news, explaining its appeal to journalists 
who find themselves in an increasingly fragmented and commercially exposed industry; and 
faced with a political class who put media strategy at the heart of their campaigning and 
governing activities. I have defended process news as a necessary element of political 
journalism due its empowering potential for citizens, and explored how politicians are 
complicit in its manifestation. However, as it stands, the sheer amount of process news and its 
cynical presentation mean that it often represents an obstacle to democratic empowerment and 
engagement. The challenges facing political journalism are many: the commercial climate, the 
pressure to produce more copy for multiple news outlets, the decreasing willingness for 
politicians to go ‘off message’, the obstacles to ‘truth’ in the shape of political spin doctors, 
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plus the difficulty of explaining complex issues to an audience with limited knowledge and 
interest – all potentially stand in the way of redirecting journalism towards political news that 
feels less need to present politics as a game played by power-hungry schemers. 
Why worry about these challenges? The news media plays a central role in the health 
of a democracy, and have a duty to exercise this power responsibly. The choices made by 
journalists when covering politics can have significant implications for how audiences 
perceive politics, politicians, and indeed the news itself. Given the wider concerns about 
falling trust in the political class, public disengagement from mainstream politics, not to 
mention falling trust in and readership of newspapers, the media must bear some of the 
responsibility, and this may mean considering different ways of covering politics.  
What practical steps might be made to meet these challenges and improve the quality 
of news that citizens receive? Or, to take the theme of the book, how can political journalism 
be retold? Firstly, they are not straightforward to meet, and in some cases require reciprocal 
movements from politicians. Secondly, the suggestions offered do not claim to offer anything 
especially original, given the amount of attention the media and politics nexus has received in 
recent years. Still, they are worth elucidating as they can help raise the pressure for change, as 
well as elaborate the positive consequences that change may achieve.  
Process news is a product of the culture of journalism, and supported by its adherence 
to news values. Kerbel (1998) has documented how political reporters are unaware that they 
are covering politics as a game and are unable to imagine how an election could be covered if 
not as a horse race. It is therefore important to recognise that covering politics as a game is a 
choice, and there are other ways to characterise it, even during elections. As Kerbel et al. 
explain, the strategy frame may be particularly appealing for TV journalists during an election 
campaign because it can be partly driven by an adherence to a norm of objectivity, or 
‘principled detachment’.85 For TV journalists, objectivity is a thorny matter, and with a wide 
range of information available, reporters must make decisions about what subjects and 
perspectives constitute dispassionate coverage. Having mutually accepted standards for what 
comprises appropriate election news reduces the risk of appearing biased, and therefore 
covering elections from the strategic perspective serves this end.86 Journalists will often 
therefore try to maintain a healthy distance from accusations of bias by highlighting the daily 
conflicts in Westminster, addressing how parties are doing in the horse race of opinion polls, 
and discussing the strategies employed to outmanoeuvre opponents. This is safer than 
engaging in substantive issues like the implications of a proposed policy, because there may 
not be equal amounts of evidence to support both sides. 
A senior BBC political correspondent explains this mindset well: 
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 Here we have our ‘Punch and Judy rows’. They are easy to cover because they fall 
into that ‘British-wish-to-have-two-sides’. They are neat because they are told briefly, 
only need two bits of actuality, and require very little explanation, because people are 
familiar with the ideas, and you don’t need to explain too much.87  
 
In this sense, the focus on strategy is probably as well explained by journalistic professional 
norms as much as an in-built cynical perspective of political affairs. But this is still not 
without its problems, because if the aim is to increase public understanding of a complex 
issue, then simply offering conflicting perspectives can be counterproductive, because 
complex debates are simplified into polarised positions, potentially creating more heat than 
light.88 Furthermore, the way these ‘Punch and Judy’ rows are framed is often not as 
principled stands, but as cynical manoeuvres in order to appeal to a voter segment or outflank 
opponents. The easiest decision for broadcasters is to continue to avoid engaging in the issues 
because of the potential accusations of bias associated with it. But reconnecting with their 
audience does not mean scrapping impartiality, but allowing more voices in. 
The first suggestion is underpinned by a second, broader, one for journalists, which is 
to place citizens rather than politicians at the centre of their coverage. This point has been 
elaborated by Lewis, whose argument is that the majority of news coverage tends to address 
audiences as passive spectators rather than empowered citizens.89 Even if the economics of 
news production are driving process news, through news values, then he argues these should 
be challenged. After all, once interrogated, many news values serve neither a commercial or 
public interest purpose: 
  
Their operational presence is justified by a tautology: it is news simply because it 
meets our definition of what news is – what Peter Dahlgren (1992) calls “the aura of 
the self-evident”. Or as David Althiede bluntly puts it: “news is whatever news 
people say it is” (1986, p. 17). Thus defined, it need serve no other purpose.90 
 
Indeed, we may need to challenge part of the commercial news value basis on which process 
news is built. The idea that it is more appealing than issue-based news is only partially 
supported by the evidence to date, suggesting news organisations may be misunderstanding 
their audience somewhat. Instead, we might argue for a set of news values in which 
citizenship is foregrounded. In the case of elections for example, rather than conceiving the 
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‘public interest’ as no more than which candidate we find most likeable, and thus focusing on 
aspects of their media performance and electoral prospects, it might mean starting with the 
question of what difference it actually makes to people’s lives if one candidate wins rather 
than another. Then, according to Lewis, a different type of contest might be encouraged in 
which what is at stake is less about the fortunes of one politician or another, and more about 
the way that we and others live.91  
These suggestions do not mean journalists only engaging in worthy, dispassionate 
policy debates, but making the issues more relevant to people’s lives. It also does not mean 
neglecting process news altogether, as its exposure of media management, personal rivalries, 
and the inside story of politics can have a public interest function. And it does not aim to 
create two kinds of news – one for the well informed, and one for the rest – but instead aims 
to re-conceive news by focusing on what it is useful for people to know. 
If some of the suggestions for journalists are to be successful, then they must be at 
least mirrored by a reassessment of relations with the media adopted by politicians. If this is 
achieved, then it may go some way to mending the relationship between journalists and 
politicians, which is widely regarded as in need of repair, and one of the root causes of 
cynically framed process news. Indeed, Brants et al recently characterised this as the ‘real 
spiral of cynicism’.92 Some progress has been made as a result of the 2004 Phillis Report on 
UK government communications, such as making more press briefings open and on the 
record, and introducing new rules governing the conduct of special advisers within the civil 
service. But the problems run deeper than that.  
 
Many politicians believe that the national media “are only out to shaft us”, that they 
use MPs to add colour to stories irrespective of the effect on the MP and that they will 
twist words to suit the story. Consequently, politicians become more defensive and 
adhere strictly to the party line, refusing to be drawn into debates (…) The result is 
that the audience are left as bystanders, spectators to an often ugly struggle.93  
 
This has been described as a 'vicious' circle evolving at the heart of British politics, where the 
mutual distrust between politicians, their media handlers and the news media have created an 
environment where it is difficult for politicians of any side to make meaningful contributions 
to public debates.94  
If we take the issue of Britain and the EU as an example, the media and politicians 
have consistently called for a proper debate on the subject in this country, but it is not likely 
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to happen in the current climate of relations between the two. The media criticise politicians 
for not speaking their mind, and for stifling debate about the future of the EU. But when they 
do speak their mind, there are immediate stories of splits, conflicts and crises. The current 
stand-off between the two means that politicians talk less and less about Europe and simply 
follow the party line, while the media and political opponents pounce on any opportunity to 
claim a split. For slightly different reasons, a similar situation existed at the last general 
election, where the main political parties refused to seriously engage in the two most 
important issues for the public (public spending cuts and immigration).95 In both cases, 
adopting the approach of staying strictly ‘on message’ whilst focusing on superficial points 
scoring may save politicians from engaging in complex and difficult discussions, but it does 
little to promote wider understanding of the issues facing the country, nor does it appear to 
inspire the public.  
For their part, in order for their complaints about process news to hold weight, 
politicians should give more consideration for how their statements may contribute to public 
understanding of an issue, rather than their contribution to the political game. Upon becoming 
leaders of their respective parties, both David Cameron and Ed Milliband promised an end to 
‘Punch and Judy’ style politics, and to pursue a more measured and constructive dialogue. 
This is a pledge they have failed to keep.96 If politicians have more confidence that their 
policy statements will not be interrogated only for their contribution to the political game – 
such as evidence of splits or an appeal to a voter segment – then they in turn might feel less 
inclined to stick to the party line and speak in bland soundbites rather than answer straight 
questions, and rely less on news management techniques, which are some of journalists’ main 
complaints.97 The result may be the encouragement of a public discourse about politics that is 
more conducive to open and constructive dialogue, rather than distrust, hostility and cynicism.   
Of course, we cannot force people to be interested or active citizens. But we can think 
about how to facilitate the conditions in which active citizenship may flourish. Reforming 
some aspects of how politics is conducted and reported may be one step towards this goal. 
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